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Watching television continues to dominate a large part of our waking hours and yet it occupies a bafflingly small part of the media policy agenda in places like the UK and the US. Why might this be the case? Perhaps because it represents a declining passion and a fading industry that has been overtaken by digital pursuits? Not according to the data presented in this chapter that suggests the opposite: that television is stubbornly popular and set to play a decisive role in the new online media ecology. Perhaps then because of a reluctance to get involved in questions of ‘content’ for fear of undermining First Amendment and media freedom principles. This might be more persuasive if it were not for the very decisive interventions curbing freedom of expression that we have seen in recent years from the use of the Espionage Act by the Obama administration to intimidate journalists (CPJ 2013) to prime minister David Cameron’s warning to British journalists to show ‘social responsibility’ in the reporting of state secrets (Watt 2013). When pressed, few administrations show that much fear in calling for content controls.

More likely, it is simply because contemporary policymaking is far more comfortable when dealing with questions of technology and infrastructure than it is when engaging with purposeful or progressive interventions into media structures. Yet these policy initiatives have often been at the heart of our media systems – from an institution like the BBC, itself nothing more than a creature of public policy, to instruments like the Fairness Doctrine and the ‘Fin-Syn’ rules in the US that sought to promote more marginal voices and to prevent the monopolization of the airwaves by only a handful of companies. In neoliberal times, however, it is market logic rather than the public interest that is deemed to drive innovation and to satisfy consumers and therefore there is significant pressure on all parts of the media to deliver economic efficiency, brand value and export potential as the most desirable public policy objectives. In this context, markets have been liberalized, public service broadcasters disciplined and technology fetishized (Freedman 2008).

Recent communications policy in the UK epitomizes this approach. The policy agenda is overwhelmingly focused on building and securing the digital economy and has therefore prioritized questions of broadband connectivity, intellectual property, consumer safety and affordability (DCMS 2013) above the need to nurture a creative infrastructure that is capable of delivering quality content to diverse audiences about a range of issues and in a variety of registers. Policymakers’ attention is focused less on the resources and institutions necessary to make the broadcast content that audiences continue to consume in their millions than on stimulating broadband roll-out and updating regulatory structures to meet the demands of an evolving digital.  Yet, broadcast audiences keep growing and demonstrate a resilience that seems more than a little surprising given the predictions made by George Gilder nearly 25 years ago of a ‘life after television’ (Gilder 1994 [1990]).

This chapter reflects on why UK policymakers are not directing public resources towards and focusing attention on television given that it plays such a vital role in the daily lives of citizens and provides us with such a crucial framework through which to make sense of the world. It also highlights the need to challenge the increasing enclosure of free-to-air programmes given the fact that ‘inclusion’ and ‘connectivity’ are such policy buzzwords. The current ‘hands off’ approach to policy means that television is largely at the mercy of a market sensibility (not just in commercial but also in public service broadcasting) that is not able to distribute cultural resources on an equitable basis. I want to argue instead for a commitment to the redistribution of resources and a paradigm shift inside policy debates to ensure that there is a more democratic institutional arrangement inside the broadcast media so that citizens are more adequately represented and private interests are more effectively regulated in the public interest.

TELEVISION IS NOT DEAD

Television viewing is increasing

The measurement of TV consumption is far from perfect and different surveys tend to produce different results. However, one conclusion remains clear: television viewing is far from disappearing and, indeed, we appear to be watching more rather than less TV. In the US, average daily consumption of TV has increased nearly 20 per cent, from 264 minutes in 2010 to 311 minutes in 2013 (Statistic Brain 2013). Even in studies that show slightly different figures, viewers still manage to spend some 271 minutes per day with television in contrast to the 309 minutes they spent with digital platforms (Steel 2013). Of course, given that it is not clear how much of this latter figure is accounted for by online viewing of television or television-like content, it would be premature to suggest here that broadcast consumption is declining.

In the UK, the communications regulator Ofcom (2013a: 127) reports that average viewing has increased from 218 minutes per day in 2007 to 240 minutes in 2012, a 10% rise. The figure varies across different demographics so while it is true that those aged above 65 are, by far, the heaviest consumers of TV, ‘digital natives’—those aged between 16 and 24 who were predicted to lead the exodus from a supposedly obsolete technology—watch exactly the same amount of TV as they did back in 2004: two hours and thirty six minutes a day (2013a: 182).

The grip of television on our cultural habits is even more pronounced when we compare TV viewing to time spent, for example, with Facebook or Twitter. While we watch TV for some 7000 minutes per month, we spend a mere 484 minutes a month on Facebook or a paltry 33 minutes a month using Twitter (Ofcom 2013a: 299). In the US, average monthly use of Facebook was higher, 1105 minutes per month (Statista 2013), but nevertheless marginal in comparison to the more than 9000 hours spent in front of the TV. In fact, far from undermining the appeal of TV, social media innovations have merely extended its allure, offering audiences new possibilities to converse, comment and interact with each other and with the programmes. It is widely acknowledged that Twitter, for example, has improved the viewing experience of everything from the BBC’s politics panel show Question Time to the international format behemoth X Factor. Partnering with, not squashing, social media is now the accepted corporate strategy particularly in relation to ‘media events’ like the Superbowl in the US or the Christmas period in the UK when hugely expensive advertisements are aired to lucrative mass audiences who have already been ‘warmed up’ with campaigns run on social media channels. The 2013 Christmas commercial for retail giant John Lewis involved a ‘film-style “premiere”’ that took up an entire ad break during the X Factor, having already been teased on social media. The company spent £6 million on buying the television airtime and a further £1 million on social media and other channels (Butler 2013). 

Not surprisingly therefore, television’s continuing popularity means that advertisers are still willing to invest vast amounts of money in TV, an amount that is expected to grow in the next few years. The influential Magna Global report revealed that in 2013, television accounted for 40% of all US advertising, a higher proportion than that directed online (Magna Global 2013). Even in the UK where online advertising is now the dominant form, TV advertising revenue is expected to reach record levels, nearly £4 billion, in 2014 (Deans 2013). This, along with growth in subscription payments, has contributed to a 10 per cent growth in overall television revenue in the UK in the last five years, rising from £11 billion in 2007 to £12.3 billion in 2012 (Ofcom 2013a: 21). Money is flowing into and not out of television.

So despite predictions that TV would lose viewers and interest when faced with the enormity of the challenge from digital developments and social media, it appears that it has continued to make itself relevant to a range of audiences across different demographics. Indeed, despite the challenges from a range of new devices, television remains by far the most engrained and popular activity: while 20 per cent of the public would miss their mobile phones the most, some 43 per cent would miss watching TV (Ofcom 2013a: 27). Despite the challenge from online sources, TV remains easily ‘the most important and frequently-used mode of news consumption’ (2013a: 105) with 78 per cent of the UK population relying on television news compared to 40 per cent for newspapers, 35 per cent for radio and only 32 per cent for online platforms (2013a: 105). 

It is not the case that nothing has changed— television has undergone a huge transformation in the last generation, shifting from analogue to digital, low to high resolution,  ‘stupid’ to ‘smart’, live at the point of consumption to asynchronous and, of course, from a handful of channels to multi-channel—but that these changes also involve a significant continuity of experience. As one business report notes, ‘Television today is little changed from a decade ago and yet at the same time profoundly different. The ways in which we consume television have altered relatively little, but supply has evolved markedly’ (Deloitte 2012: 1) with the emergence of new content providers, distribution mechanisms and funding streams. To understand television today is to appreciate both the continuity of its appeal as a creative form and the transformation of how this form is delivered to audiences.

Public service channels still have most of the audience

Television viewing in the UK is still largely dominated by the five free-to-air public service (PSB) channels operated by the BBC, ITV, Channel 4 and Five. Recent figures show that these channels had a audience share of 52 per cent of all households (Ofcom 2013a: 188), a significant decline since 2004 when they accounted for nearly three-quarters of all viewing. However, this is more than compensated by the growth in viewing of their ‘portfolio’ channels like BBC3, ITV2, More4 and E4. The success of these channels has meant that audiences for the total output of the PSB operators in multichannel homes have actually stayed pretty constant with a 72.9 per cent share 2012. Despite the view that multi-channel television has fragmented the audience and diminished the appeal of the traditional broadcasters, the share of PSB viewing has remained constant while that of the non-PSB channels has actually declined substantially from 2004 when it accounted for 35 per cent of viewing to now when it has only a 27 per cent share, a 22 per cent decline.

Of course it is true that BBC1 and ITV1 do not have the stranglehold over audiences that they used to exert, falling from a combined 53.5 per cent share in 2004 to only 36 per cent in 2012, but their influence is qualitatively greater than any other non-PSB channel. For example, the most popular pay TV channel, Sky Sports 1, attracts a mere 1.2 per cent of the multichannel audience (Ofcom 2013a: 200) while the total share for Sky programmes (including all of its sports, movies, news and entertainment channels) has actually fallen from 10.4 per cent in 2004 to 8.3 per cent in 2012 (2013a: 194). Let us make this clear: in the midst of a decisive shift from analogue to digital television and given the growth of multichannel television, the share of both the BBC and ITV in multichannel homes has increased since 2004 while that of the largest pay TV company, BSkyB, has decreased. This is probably not the headline you will see in any news bulletin nor are you likely to discover that, while trust in the British press is amongst the lowest in Europe, over three-quarters of the British public are either ‘quite’ or ‘very satisfied’ with public service broadcasting (Ofcom 2013b: 12).

Changes in viewing and consumption habits are often overstated

We need carefully to consider discourses about the inevitability of the digital ‘revolution’ that underpin the thinking of leading policy actors about whether the popularization of digital technologies may make traditional media regulation obsolete. For example, many have long predicted the radical impact of digital video recorders (DVRs) on the viewing experience with the former BBC director general Greg Dyke describing them at the turn of this century as ‘the real revolution’ (BBC 2000). Yet most recent figures themselves show something rather different: that while 67 per cent of households now have a DVR, some 90 per cent of viewing even in these homes remains live (Ofcom 2013a: 202). If we break this down more, we find that of the 10 per cent that is ‘time shifted’, just under half is watched on the same day with the remainder consumed within a week of the original broadcast. Research by Enders Analysis reveals higher levels of timeshift viewing with some 19 per cent of viewing taking place ‘after the event’ but even here, Enders admit that, since 2007, the share of timeshift viewing ‘has remained very stable, underlining its importance as a second line of choice after an initial search through the main broadcast channels’ (Enders 2013: 7). Indeed, personal recording technology has not displaced but ‘reinforced the appeal of the live linear schedule’ (2013:8). Despite the increasing popularity of catch-up TV, and in particular the BBC’s iPlayer, the viewing experience remains overwhelmingly a live one. This is also the case in the US where, despite many predictions of an on-demand environment, more than 90 per cent of TV viewing remained live in 2012 with 278 minutes consumed every day in traditional linear fashion as opposed to 24 minutes that were time shifted (Poggi 2012).

PSB channels dominate investment in UK programming

Public service channels account for a majority of spending on UK television—£2.9 billion out of £5.6 billion in total (Ofcom 2013a: 166-67) and certainly make up by far the biggest proportion of investment in original UK programming. The £2.6 billion spent on original output in 2012 was only slightly less than the total spend on all programming by commercial multichannels of £2.7billion, 65 per cent of which is taken up by buying rights for sport and films alone (Ofcom 2013a: 176). Indeed, BSky’s B promise to invest £600 million per year on original homegrown content by the end of 2014 seems a rather paltry one in relation to its enormous revenue and healthy profits: £7.2 billion and £1.33b billion respectively in 2013 (BSkyB 2013: 30), far exceeding those of its rivals. This disjuncture between revenue and the commissioning of original output is rarely commented on and certainly not seen as an issue for public policy. Sylvia Harvey is right to describe this reluctance to confront pay TV’s priorities as ‘one of neoliberalism’s blindspots’: that ‘there is an inability or unwillingness to see that it is the lauded and arguably most competitive television that invests the least in original production’ (Harvey 2006: 105). 

THE ENCLOSURE OF TELEVISION

Instead of talking up Twitter or fetishizing Facebook, we need to reflect on the fact that television viewing remains incredibly important in the midst of a digital ‘revolution’. Despite the apocalyptic predictions that surround the contemporary television environment—that linear viewing is a twentieth century phenomenon, that there is limited appetite for public service broadcasting, that the main  free-to-air channels are likely to be obsolete in a digital future—there is little evidence to support these assertions. PSB channels continue to command a high degree of loyalty and are the drivers of investment in original programming; despite significant fragmentation, overall levels of television viewing have remained constant thanks to the increasing number of channels and communicative possibilities offered by social media platforms; television remains by far the most popular source for national and international news, sports and entertainment; and television remains the most ‘loved’ communication service. The issue we need to address, however, is what resources are necessary to secure a television service that operates in the interests of its viewers and in their capacities as citizens who wish actively to shape the world and not merely to consume it through the screens that increasingly surround us.

The problem is that the dominant policy and regulatory responses to existing habits and emerging platforms is failing to secure these resources on behalf of the public. We are instead in the grip of a commitment to market forces and an uncritical celebration of technological innovation that threatens radically to disrupt the shared public spaces historically offered by broadcasting and that ought to be offered by social media platforms in the future. It is now a truism to say that the citizen inside media policy has been displaced by the consumer (Livingstone, Lunt and Miller 2007). 

The result is that while more money is now being invested in TV content, it is not being shared out evenly and is systematically skewed towards certain genres and channels. Much more money is being spent on film and sport channels, up by just over 50 per cent since 2007 in comparison to a 6 per cent rise for BBC One and falls in spending on other main channels, 18 per cent for BBC2, 4 per cent for ITV1 and 7 per cent for Channel 4, the home of independent production (Ofcom 2011: 121, 2013a: 167). Spending on PSB output has fallen in total by some 17 per cent in the last five years (Ofcom 2013b: 17). While the total hours of first-run originated peak-time output on PSB channels is pretty much the same as it was in 2007, it has substantially decreased outside of peak hours and by some 7 per cent in terms of regional output. Spend on original material, however, has been really squeezed: down by 7 per cent on BBC1 since 2007, 28 per cent on BBC2, 13 per cent on ITV1, 13 per cent on Channel Four and 4 per cent on Channel 5 (Ofcom 2013b: 22) making up a total decrease in investment in original programming on PSB channels of just under 25 per cent since a high point I between 2002-2004 (Ofcom 2013b: 18).

Some genres have been especially affected by this redistribution of PSB spend. Despite the emergence of new digital platforms, news budgets in 2012 were down by 13 per cent since 2007, arts by a huge 40 per cent, education by 41 per cent and children’s programmes by 23 per cent (Ofcom 2013b: 26). Spend on factual programming has decreased by 22 per cent in the last five years despite a significant increase in the number of hours that points to a redefinition of ‘factual programming’ towards lower cost, lifestyle output. To put it simply, those genres which have long been at the heart of the public service project have been hit the hardest while only one genre has had spending increased: sports where investment has risen by 16 per cent (2013b: 26). Of course, this is all relative and public service broadcasters still managed to spend over half a billion pounds on original drama in 2012 but the direction of travel is, nevertheless, a warning. Spending is being directed towards those genres that are likely to be most profitable – or rather removed from those genres with little obvious commercial viability.

What is the response from viewers? As I have already pointed out, consumption continues to rise but substantially more people think that TV is getting worse than getting better (31 per cent in contrast to 13 per cent) although for the over 65s, a near majority (48 per cent) think it is deteriorating while only 8 per cent think it is improving. What accounts for this perception of decline? Overwhelmingly, it is not because of concerns with bad language, violence or sex but simply because of ‘more repeats’, a ‘lack of variety’ and ‘more reality shows’ (Ofcom 2011: 154). This is a question of funding priorities and not of moral decline.

We should also be concerned about the wider implications of a shift to subscription-based viewing and, especially, about the grip of Sky on pay TV. Subscription is now by far the dominant source of revenue in UK television and has risen from 34% in 2004 to 43 per cent of total broadcast revenue in 2012, well above that of advertising (less than 30 per cent) and licence fee income (only 22 per cent). What this means is that, adding together subscription revenue and the proportion of advertising that goes to pay channels, more than 50 per cent of all revenue is generated from only 27 per cent of the viewing audience (Ofcom 2013a: 179) – a section of the population that is super-exploited and under-served in the provision of UK originated content. 

The significance of subscription as the dominant form of television revenue has an added impact in that increasing amounts of content are now being hidden behind rather expensive paywalls. We are seeing therefore the simultaneous driving down of investment in original content in key genres at the same time as the enclosure of other forms of content. While 59 per cent of regular sports viewers see Premier League football as ‘must have content’ (OECD 2013: 4), they are forced to pay premium prices for it, in part to cover the enormous costs of acquiring football rights – most recently £3 billion paid by Sky and BT in 2012 for three years of live coverage. Sky also signed an exclusive deal with HBO in 2010, worth around £150 million over five years, to have exclusive access to both first-run and archive HBO programmes including Boardwalk Empire, Mad Men, Entourage and Curb Your Enthusiasm. This resulted in Mad Men, for example, moving from a channel with a 7 per cent audience share to Sky Atlantic, a channel currently with a 0.2 per cent share (BARB 2013).  As we have already noted, Sky’s promised to spend £600 million on original UK material by the end of 2014 is aimed at channels including Sky One, with a 0.9 per cent audience share and the two Sky Arts channels, each of which currently have an average weekly viewing of one minute, with Sky Arts 1 registering a 0.1 per cent share and Sky Arts 2 registering nothing at all (BARB 2013). Of course, we should welcome any new investment into original programming but what about if it is going into gated communities aimed thus far at a tiny minority of people who happen to get the channels because, by and large, they are sports fans who have little choice except to subscribe if they are to watch their favourite football teams? Public money aimed at mass audiences is being replaced by private money aimed at lucrative subscription audiences in a twenty-first century iteration of the vision of Alan Peacock who was commissioned by Margaret Thatcher in 1985 to develop proposals for a more market-friendly TV structure (Goodwin 1998).

THE SATURATION OF MARKET LOGIC IN THE POLICY PROCESS

Should the near disappearance of programmes like Mad Men and Boardwalk Empire be seen as a public policy question or is this simply how the market operates? This is a moot question as, despite its popularity, it is not television that provides the organizing logic for contemporary media policy but the internet as part of a more general transition to a digital environment. This has obvious implications for how, and whether, we can continue to regulate the broadcast media in the public interest given a stated preference, particularly in relation to digital platforms, to pursue self- and co-regulation. The previous government’s Digital Britain white paper argued that we are now at a ‘tipping point’ (BIS/DCMS 2009: 11) in relation to the transformative impact of the internet on our media environments and insisted that, when it comes to public service broadcasting, we need ‘to address the place for intervention and the transition in the type of intervention as we move from the analogue to the fully digital world’ (2009: 18). The message here is clear: in an on-demand world characterized by abundance and consumer choice, there is little scope for purposeful interventions to address inequalities in representation and access such as the marginalization of women on screen and in the industry (Doherty 2012) and the stereotyping of working class people (Jones 2013).

Instead, there is a focus on consumer rights and questions of efficiency and affordability. The government’s latest media policy statement is called Connectivity, Content and Consumers (DCMS 2013) and subordinates content issues to those of broadband development, spectrum management and consumer safety in the context of the overall need to achieve economic growth. Its proposals to support ‘world-beating content’, in other words content that is easily exportable and thus valuable, is almost entirely economically or technologically determined: to maintain the prominence of public service broadcasters at the top of the Electronic Programme Guide, to provide tax breaks for digital media content and to target intellectual property crime (2013: 24-30). Where it does mention proactive regulation, it is only to minimize it by reducing Ofcom’s duties in relation to public service broadcasters in order ‘to reduce unnecessary burdens’ (2013: 9). The only recognition of an imbalance in the programme supply market is its wish to see the end of payments made by PSBs to pay TV operators to carry their programmes – a scandal that ought to have been terminated some time ago. Overall, while it is entirely legitimate to reflect on the impact of digital technologies on market and consumer behaviour, there is an incredibly narrow focus on competition and absolutely no conception of how best to produce and sustain content that is not privileged by the market.





In his short book On Television, Pierre Bourdieu rails against the fetishization of audience ratings and the saturation of market principles inside television as fundamentally anti-democratic. According to him: 

Submission to the requirements of this marketing instrument is the exact equivalent for culture of what poll-based demagogy is for politics. Enslaved by audience ratings, television imposes market pressures on the supposedly free and enlightened consumer. These pressures have nothing to do with the democratic expression of enlightened collective opinion or public rationality...(2011: 66-67).
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